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HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 
Opposition to Human Rights Treaties in 
the United States Senate: The Legacy of 
the Bricker Amendment 
Natalie Hevener Kaufman and David Whiteman* 
My purpose in offering this resolution is to bury the so-called covenant 
on human rights so deep that no one holding high public office will 
ever dare to attempt its resurrection.' 
Senator John Bricker (R-Ohio), 1951 
As we consider the status of the human rights covenants today, it would 
appear that the ghost of Senator John Bricker must be smiling at the fulfillment 
of his wish. Thirty years after the defeat of the Bricker Amendment, the 
covenants and most other major human rights treaties have yet to receive 
Senate approval.2 During the same period, these covenants have been rat- 
ified by eighty-five other nations, including fifteen Western democracies.3 
The question which deserves our attention is why the United States has not 
ratified these treaties as well. The United States has long considered itself 
the leading protector of human rights. Many Americans consider the Dec- 
laration of Independence and its references to "inalienable rights" to be the 
source of reintroduction of basic human rights into the modern political 
*We would like to thank Louis Sohn, Jerel Rosati, and Paul Gordon Lauren for their helpful 
comments on this article. 
1. Congressional Record. 82nd Cong., 1st sess., 1951. Vol. 97, pt. 8, 8263. 
2. Some human rights treaties have been ratified. Two treaties from the early 1950s, the 
Convention on the Political Rights of Women and the Inter-American Convention on the 
Granting of Political Rights to Women, were ratified in 1975. In 1968, the Senate ratified 
the Supplementary Slavery Convention, which extended the 1926 Slavery Convention and 
its Protocol. Some scholars would also include the four Geneva Protocols which cover 
wartime conditions and the Protocol on the Status of Refugees. 
3. United Nations, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General: Status as of 
31 December 1986 (New York: United Nations, 1986). Western democracies ratifying the 
covenants are: Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, the Federal Republic 
of Germany, Iceland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom. 
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scene. Most Americans believe that the United States has the best record 
on human rights of any country in the world. When these treaties appear 
to reflect the highest ideals of the American people, and when our allies 
and other democracies have been able to reconcile their political and legal 
systems with the obligations of the treaties, why is the United States still 
unable to do so? 
The purpose of this analysis is to explore in a systematic fashion (1) the 
original development of arguments in opposition to human rights treaties in 
the United States Senate and (2) the residual strength of these arguments in 
contemporary deliberations. We base our findings on legal analysis, legis- 
lative histories, content analysis of congressional hearings, and interviews 
with congressional staff members. Our main conclusions are that proponents 
of the Bricker Amendment were primarily concerned with human rights 
treaties, that contemporary arguments against passage of human rights trea- 
ties have not changed substantially from arguments presented in the 1950s, 
and that the legacy of these earlier deliberations is still apparent in the attitude 
of those considering the treaties now. 
Certainly, given the political environment of the 1950s, some suspicion 
of human rights treaties might have been expected. Two aspects of the 
environment were particularly salient: the movement toward racial integra- 
tion and the Cold War. The integration of American troops abroad during 
World Ward II and the establishment of a wartime Fair Employment Practices 
Commission were small steps which signalled the clear possibility of im- 
pending federal action to eliminate racial discrimination. The report of the 
Truman Commission on Civil Rights urged federal action to address the 
country's racial problems. Legislation was introduced into Congress to make 
lynchings a federal offense and to eliminate the poll tax. The Supreme Court 
by 1950 was hearing cases challenging Plessy v. Ferguson, and in 1952, the 
Justice Department submitted amicus curiae briefs criticizing segregation in 
education. While proponents of these civil rights measures were skeptical 
about their success, conservatives took very seriously any discussion of 
federal action to dismantle segregation within the states. States' rights were 
ardently defended as the only bulwark against an expansive federal gov- 
ernment which would impose a host of liberal programs, including the 
elimination of racial restrictions on marriage, property ownership, and ed- 
ucation. 
If civil rights were the domestic aspect of the political environment most 
relevant to treaty consideration, the Cold War was the major international 
aspect. To conservatives of the time, the essence of the United States was 
clearly threatened by communists. McCarthyism was one extreme manifes- 
tation of concern that a worldwide communist movement, directed from 
Moscow, was taking power on a global scale, and that the United States 
was the only country with the capability and potential will to halt the menace. 
Certain major events contributed to these fears. With the explosion of a 
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Soviet nuclear device in 1950, the atomic monopoly of the United States 
disappeared. The entire Korean operation, including the effective North 
Korean resistance, heightened fears of communist power and the inability 
of the United States to confront and resist it. The ascendence of the Com- 
munist Party in China, when joined with the assumption of Sino-Soviet 
friendship and cooperation, was interpreted by conservatives as seriously 
damaging United States influence and security. 
The effect of these conservative concerns can be seen clearly in delib- 
eration over human rights treaties in the 1950s. Human rights treaties re- 
ceived their most extensive review by the Senate during this period in debate 
over the so-called Bricker Amendment. Opponents of the treaties, led by 
Senator Bricker, focused their efforts on the adoption of a constitutional 
amendment which was primarily motivated by the alleged danger arising 
from these treaties. Although international legal scholars have often ac- 
knowledged this connection between the human rights treaties and the effort 
in the early 1950s to amend the treaty-making provisions of the Constitution, 
most international relations cholars have not. Most major works on Amer- 
ican foreign policy which mention the Bricker Amendment imply that its 
major purpose was the curtailment of the president's power to conclude 
executive agreements.4 One objective of this research, then, is to clarify the 
relationship between the Bricker Amendment and human rights treaties. We 
contend that, while criticism of the increased use of executive agreements 
was reflected in one section of the amendment and did become an important 
issue during the debates, the original impetus for the Bricker Amendment 
was a concern about the United Nations human rights treaties. And it was 
in the context of the Bricker Amendment controversy that these treaties were 
branded as dangerous to the American way of life and cast into a Senatorial 
limbo from which they have never really been released. 
4. Of the major foreign policy writers who treat the Bricker Amendment, the following view 
it primarily as an attempt to curb the use of executive agreements: Merlo Pusey, Eisenhower 
the President (New York: MacMillan Co., 1956), 231; Ronald Stupak, American Foreign 
Policy (New York: Harper and Row, 1976), 112; Alexander Deconde, A History of American 
Foreign Policy(New York: Charles Schribner's Sons, 1971), 778; Charles Kegley and Eugene 
Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy-Patterri and Process (New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1982), 416; John Rehm, "Making Foreign Policy through International Agreement," in The 
Constitution and the Conduct of Foreign Policy, Francis Wilcox and Richard Frank, eds. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976), 128; John Spanier, "Congress and the Presidency: 
The Weakest Link in the Policy Process," in Congress, the Presidency, and American Foreign 
Policy, John Spanier and Joseph Nogee, eds. (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981), xix. 
Other writers link the Bricker Amendment to: congressional nostalgia for lost power (Walter Murphy, Congress and the Court (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 
258); an attempt to restrict presidential freedom to commit U.S. troops overseas (John 
Spanier and Eric Uslander, How America Foreign Policy is Made (New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1975), 81); and a neo-isolationist movement to curtail U.S. internationalism 
(Louis Gersan, "J. F. Dulles," The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, 
XVIII, Robert Ferrell, ed. (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1967), 118-22). 
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Prior to consideration of the Bricker Amendment, the only extensive 
postwar Senate deliberations on human rights treaties concerned the Gen- 
ocide Convention. Many of the arguments both for and against the Genocide 
Convention are specific to it, and therefore these deliberations are not a 
good source for general arguments against human rights treaties. Neverthe- 
less, the deliberations are important because they marked the emergence of 
a small but strong group of opponents who, despite the overwhelming support 
for the Convention from many and varied individuals and organizations, 
managed to block the treaty.s Even at this early point, opponents did not 
consider the Genocide Convention to be an isolated problem, but part of a 
much larger movement-the international recognition and legal codification 
of individual human rights-which they feared would alter the nature and 
process of the American political system and the American way of life. The 
arguments that germinated during the Genocide Convention hearings later 
blossomed into full-fledged opposition to all human rights treaties. 
The remainder of the article is divided into four sections. The first section 
is an analysis of the Bricker Amendment itself, highlighting the explicit and 
implicit arguments against human rights treaties. Second, we summarize 
Senate consideration of the Bricker Amendment. In the third section, we 
offer a typology of arguments made in the 1950s against ratification of human 
rights treaties. Fourth, we consider contemporary opposition to the treaties, 
assessing the stability of arguments over time and the factors now inhibiting 
passage. 
THE BRICKER AMENDMENT 
The movement surrounding the proposal, modification, and support of the 
Bricker Amendment reflected a widespread concern within the American 
electorate. Garrett identifies two important dimensions of the movement: 
(1) a "substantive" concern about increasing United States involvement 
internationally and (2) an "institutional" dismay at the increased power and 
independence of the executive in foreign affairs.6 If we look closely at the 
5. Communications supporting the Genocide Convention were received by the Senate from 
organizations such as the American Federation of Labor, American Legion, American 
Veterans' Committee, Amvets, Bar Association of the City of New York, Catholic Association 
for International Peace, Congress of Industrial Organizations, Federal Council of Churches 
of Christ, General Federation of Women's Clubs, Loyal Order of Moose, NAACP, National 
Conference of Christians and Jews, National Federation of Business and Professional Wom- 
en's Clubs, Salvation Army, and United Council of Church Women. For a more extensive 
list, see U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on the 
Genocide Convention. Hearings on the International Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 81st Cong., 2d sess., 1950. S. Rept. 472. 
6. Steve Garrett, "Foreign Policy and the American Constitution: The Bricker Amendment in 
Contemporary Perspective," Int'I Studies Q. 16:2 (1972): 187-220. 
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immediate cause of concern, however, we can see that human rights treaties 
played the most important role in initiating and maintaining the spirited 
attack on the treaty-making powers. Opposition to the treaties, of course, 
reflected both substantive and institutional concerns. The substantive con- 
cern focused on the notion that human rights fall within a nation's domestic 
jurisdiction and are not an appropriate subject for treaty-making. The insti- 
tutional concern revolved around the issue of the distribution of power 
between the federal government and the states; human rights fall in the 
domain of "states' rights" and are, therefore, reserved to the states by the 
tenth amendment to the Constitution. 
One important point to be made is that, although there are many different 
reasons why various members of the Senate in the 1950s supported the 
collection of proposals now subsumed under the general term "Bricker 
Amendment," concern over the effects of human rights treaties was in the 
forefront. Senator Bricker himself linked his proposal to his opposition to 
the human rights treaties and their international implementation: 
There is a singleness of purpose of course on the part of all of us ... who have 
joined in the presentation of this Resolution. ... The American people want to 
make certain that no treaty or executive agreement will be effective to deny or 
abridge their fundamental rights. Also, they do not want their basic human rights 
to be supervised or controlled by international gencies over which they have 
no control.7 
Anti-communist and anti-Soviet feelings also provided motivation for the 
amendment, and often these two fears were linked. 
Iron Curtain countries would no doubt welcome a new Roosevelt-Litvinov agree- 
ment to make their confiscatory decrees effective in the United States .... 
[Rleactionary one-worlders fare] trying to vest legislative powers in non-elected 
officials of the UN and its satellite bodies with a socialist-communist majority.8 
If we examine each section of the 1953 form of the amendment, we can 
see reflected there a variety of political and legal concerns raised by the 
human rights treaties. 
Section 1 
The first section of the Bricker Amendment simply states: "A provision of a 
treaty which denies or abridges any right enumerated in this Constitution 
7. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Amend- 
ments. Hearings on S. R. Res. I and S. 1. Res. 43, Treaties and Executive Agreements. 83rd 
Cong., 1st sess., 1953. S. Rept. 2-3. (Cited hereafter as: Senate judiciary Committee 
Hearings, 1953.) 
8. Senator John Bricker, quoted in "Foreign Policy," Congressional Quarterly Almanac 10 (1954): 245. 
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shall not be of any force or effect" (emphasis added). In defending Sec- 
tion 1, Senator Bricker said it would ensure that "no [humanitarian] treaty 
can be effective to undermine the constitutional rights of American citi- 
zens....."9 The issue here is the nature and extent of the limits on the content 
of treaties. Some constitutional aw scholars had argued that treaties, being 
the supreme law of the land, were not subject to normal constitutional 
restrictions. Such would be a broad reading of Article VI, paragraph 2, of 
the Constitution: 
all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United 
States, shall be supreme Law of the land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution rLaws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding. 
Senator Bricker described Section 1 in the following manner: 
Section 1 subjects the President and the Senate to constitutional restraints inthe 
exercise of the treaty-making power comparable to those which limit heir action 
as participants in the enactment of ordinary legislation. This was, of course, the 
original intent of the framers of the Constitution a d was reflected in early judicial 
dicta.'0 
He was referring to the decision in Geofroy v. Riggs, which held that the 
treaty power does not extend "so far as to authorize what the Constitution 
forbids."" The difficulty, as Senator Bricker viewed it, was the subsequent 
decision of the Supreme Court in Missouri v. Holland, which left ambiguous 
the meaning of Article VI, paragraph 2. 
Acts of Congress are the supreme law of the land only when made in pursuance 
of the Constitution, while treaties are declared to be so when made under the 
authority of the United States. It is open to question whether the authority of 
the United States means more than the formal acts prescribed to make the 
convention.12 
Bricker saw this decision in 1919 as effectively reversing that of Geofroy v. 
Riggs, and he argued that the lack of clarity on this crucial issue made 
amendment of the Constitution a necessity. He argued that most of the rights 
contained in the Bill of Rights would be "repealed" by ratification of the 
human rights covenant. His amendment would prevent this travesty. 
9.-Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings, 1953, note 7 above, 11. 
10. John Bricker, "Making Treaties and Other International Agreements," Annals of the Amer- 
ican Academy 289 (1953): 137. 
11. 133 U.S. 266 (1889). 
12. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 433 (1919). 
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The American people resent he argument that rights which they regard as God- 
given and inalienable can be alienated by the President and two-thirds of the 
Senate present and voting.13 
Section 2 
It is in Section 2 that we see most clearly the institutional ine of attack laid 
by the Bricker proponents. They wished to secure greater protection for 
states' rights, arguing the constitutional grounds of the tenth amendment. 
Section 2 of the Bricker Amendment proposed that: 
No treaty shall authorize or permit any foreign power or any international 
organization to supervise, control, or adjudicate rights of citizens of the United 
States within the United States enumerated in this constitution or any other 
matter essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States. 
The purpose of this section was to restrain the federal government from 
further encroaching upon states' rights via the treating-making power. As 
has already been mentioned, a great concern was the use of these treaties 
to establish a federal basis for desegregation. This section would have enabled 
Congress to review all treaties before they would have any domestic appli- 
cation, thereby preventing the federal government from using treaties as a 
basis for expanding its authority into areas where power is otherwise reserved 
to the states, under the tenth amendment o the Constitution. This issue arose 
from one possible interpretation of the Missouri v. Holland decision. The 
case concerned a treaty between the United States and Great Britain reg- 
ulating, for conservation purposes, the taking of migratory birds. The state 
of Missouri challenged the treaty and the implementing legislation on the 
grounds that it interfered with states' rights and violated the tenth amendment 
of the Constitution. In upholding the treaty and federal statute, Mr. Justice 
Holmes stated: 
We do not mean to imply that there are no qualifications to the treaty-making 
power; but they must be ascertained in a different way. It is obvious that there 
may be matters of the sharpest exigency for the national well being that the 
act of Congress could not deal with but that a treaty followed by such an act 
could. .... 
The treaty in question does not contravene any prohibitory words to be found 
in the Constitution. The only question is whether it is forbidden by some invisible 
radiation from the general terms of the Tenth Amendment.14 
13. Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings, 1953, note 7 above, 6. At the time of these Hearings, 
there was a single covenant. 
14. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 432 (1919). 
316 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY Vol. 10 
To this question he answered "no." And it is this issue which led to the 
drafting of Section 2 of the Bricker Amendment. Senator Bricker stated: 
Section 2 prevents the President and the Senate from using treaties as an in- 
strument of domestic legislation without he participation f the House of Rep- 
resentatives. In addition, section 2 protects the reserved powers of the states by 
preventing Congress from acquiring by treaty legislative power which it does 
not possess in the absence of treaty. ... [It] reverses the doctrine of Missouri 
v. Holland which holds that a treaty may empower Congress to legislate in areas 
prohibited by the Tenth Amendment in the absence of treaty.1" 
In addition to states' rights concerns, Section 2 was designed to protect 
United States domestic jurisdiction. Senator Bricker cited Article 2, paragraph 
7, of the United Nations Charter and argued that the human rights treaties 
were violating this provision. 
Are human rights essentially within the domestic jurisdiction? Dr. Philip Jessup 
and many others who have represented us at the U.N. say, "No." If that is true, 
then nothing is essentially within the domestic jurisdiction. Those who oppose 
section 2 must believe that the relationship between the American people and 
their own government is not purely a domestic matter." 
He then explained that this reason was the motivating force behind all his 
efforts to amend the Constitution. 
What his amendment would in essence do is to keep the rights of the American 
people in the spiritual realm and not place them in the temporal power of an 
international government which is controlled by countries which are totalitarian 
in their philosophy and seem to have no concept of the God-given inalienable 
rights that the people of America enjoy.17 
Section 3 
A further concern of those supporting the Bricker Amendment was that courts 
might apply provisions of the human rights treaties directly, without imple- 
menting legislation from Congress. Since the treaties, in general, have no 
explicit provision that they are not self-executing, this interpretation might 
be possible. Bricker described Section 3 as an effort to prevent the invasion 
of our domestic jurisdiction through the instrumentality of human rights 
treaties. Section 3 read: "A treaty shall become effective as internal law in 
the United States only through the enactment of appropriate legislation by 
the Congress." Senator Bricker cited the Fujii case as a "reminder that treaties 
15. Bricker, note 10 above, 136. 
16. Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings, 1953, note 7 above, 9. 
17. Ibid., 12. 
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may have far-reaching and unintended consequences.... "1 In this case the 
intermediate California court cited Articles 55 and 56 of the United Nations 
Charter, as invalidating the state's alien land act. Senator Bricker concluded: 
If the Supreme Court of the United States should adopt the reasoning of the 
lower California Court, thousands of Federal and State laws will be nullified. 
... All treaties affecting domestic law must be made non-self-executing to avoid 
unintentional teration of the rights of the American people under Federal and 
State laws.19 
This section was, in effect, a second line of defense in the event that a human 
rights treaty was actually ratified by the Senate without a non-self-executing 
provision or reservation.20 Courts, then, would have been prevented from 
citing treaty provisions that had not been implemented by domestic legis- 
lation. 
Section 4 
The increase in the use of executive agreements and their effect on the rights 
of Americans also troubled Senator Bricker and his supporters. Section 4 
responded to the fear of abrogation of rights by agreements not submitted 
to Congress: 
All executive and other agreements between the President and any international 
organization, foreign power, or official thereof shall be made only in the manner 
and to the extent to be prescribed by law. Such agreements shall be subject to 
the limitations imposed on treaties, or the making of treaties, by this article. 
This section was a reaction to the Supreme Court's decisions in the Belmont 
and Pink cases. At issue was the Litvinov agreement, signed as part of the 
settlement surrounding the recognition of the Soviet government. It was not 
submitted to Congress, and it did result in property transfers which were 
contrary to the state law of New York. Bricker bitterly presented the case in 
the following manner: 
Foreign creditors were entitled to the protection of the fifth amendment. Both 
Russia nd the United States were powerless to deprive them of that property. 
However, the Supreme Court held that an agreement between Franklin Roosevelt 
and Maxim Litvinov cancelled out property rights otherwise protected by the 
fifth amendment and the public policy of the State of New York.21 
18. Ibid., 7. 
19. Ibid., 7--8. 
20. An attachment o the ratification resolution for the Genocide Convention requires exactly 
this step: that implementing legislation be enacted by Congress before the treaty is officially 
ratified by the United States. 
21. Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings, 1953, note 7 above, 7-8. 
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The more general issue was the determination by the Court that: "A treaty 
is a "law of the land" under the supremacy clause ... of the Constitution. 
Such international compacts and agreements as the Litvinov assignment have 
a similar dignity."22 In other words, executive agreements have the same 
constitutional status as treaties. Thus, the Bricker forces argued that if human 
rights treaties and agreements were acceded to by the United States as 
executive agreements without the consent of the Senate, they could be used 
to deprive Americans of their basic rights, including the right to private 
property. 
Summary 
In the final analysis, it would appear that the crucial topic of debate became 
whether or not human rights is an appropriate subject matter for treaty- 
making. Opposition to the conclusion of human rights treaties came to signify 
the protection of domestic jurisdiction, the maintenance of states' rights, and 
the defense against the encroachment of international organizations. As 
Senator Bricker put it: "the peace of the world is endangered by the U.N.'s 
ambition to supervise and control the purely domestic affairs of its mem- 
bers .. 
."23 He specifically attacked the covenant: 
the State Department of the previous administration contended that the U.N. 
draft Covenants on Human Rights were great humanitarian treaties, and that the 
American people should cheerfully submit heir political, civil, and economic 
rights to United Nations definition, supervision, and control.24 
FORMAL CONGRESSIONAL DELIBERATIONS 
On 17 July 1951, Senator Bricker made a direct attack on the human rights 
treaties by proposing that the Senate adopt a resolution that would have 
required that the president announce that the covenant was unacceptable 
and withdraw the United States from participation in drafting it and other 
human rights treaties. In the course of debate, Senator Bricker characterized 
the covenant as "a Covenant on Human Slavery," a legalization of "the most 
vicious restrictions of dictators," a "legal basis for the most repressive mea- 
sures of atheistic tyranny," "an attempt to repeal the Bill of Rights," a threat 
to freedom of religion, and "a blueprint for tyranny."25 
22. U.S. v. Pink, 315 U.S. 230 (1942). 
23. Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings, 1953, note 7 above, 9. 
24. Ibid., 10. 
25. Congressional Record. 82nd Cong., 1st sess. 1951. Vol. 97, pt. 8, 8255. 
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By 14 September 1951, Senator Bricker moved to introduce a consti- 
tutional amendment aimed at protecting the "sacred rights which [U.S. 
citizens] enjoy under the Bill of Rights and the Constitution."26 On 7 February 
1952, Senator Bricker introduced, with fifty-nine co-sponsors, a second con- 
stitutional amendment.27 In introducing the amendment, Senator Bricker 
made specific mention of the human rights covenants. 
There is not the remotest chance that even one-third of the present Senate would 
undermine the rights of the American people by voting for the U.N. Covenant 
on Human Rights or any other treaty of similar import. However, the rights and 
freedoms enumerated in the Constitution must be protected in perpetuity, and 
not merely by the suffrance of the President and two-thirds of the Senators 
present and voting.28 
The Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings on the Bricker Amendment 
in May and June of 1952. By a vote of nine to five, the Committee approved 
an amended version, but the Senate adjourned without debating the issue. 
On 7 January 1953, Senator Bricker once again introduced a consti- 
tutional amendment, this time co-sponsored by sixty-two Senators.29 Support 
had grown for some form of the amendment and passage appeared likely. 
At the hearings held in 1953 by the Senate Judiciary Committee, the Eisen- 
hower administration expressed its opposition to the amendment through 
testimony by Secretary of State Dulles. Dulles had the difficult task of re- 
versing himself publicly on human rights treaties. Supporters of the Bricker 
Amendment had frequently cited a speech by Dulles in which he stated that 
treaties "can take powers from the States and give them to the Federal 
Government or to some international body, and they can cut across the 
rights given the people by their constitutional Bill of Rights."30 In an effort 
to assuage the fears of the Bricker followers and undercut support for the 
amendment, Dulles made the following conciliatory statement: 
This administration is committed to the exercise of the treaty making power 
only within traditional limits. . 
... [W]hile we [the administration] shall not 
withhold our counsel from those who seek to draft a treaty or covenant on 
human rights, we do not ourselves look upon a treaty as the means which we 
would select as the proper and most effective way to spread throughout the 
world the goals of human liberty.... We, therefore, do not intend to become 
a party to any such covenant or present it as a treaty for consideration by the 
Senate.... 31 
26. Ibid., 11361. 
27. Congressional Record. 82nd Cong., 2d sess., 1952. Vol. 98, pt. 1, 907-14. Also, Laurence 
Smith (R-Wisc.) introduced the same amendment into the House on 11 February 1952. 
28. Ibid., 908. 
29. S.J. 130 was introduced and expired during the 82nd Congress. 
30. John Bricker and Charles Webb, "Treaty Law vs. Domestic Constitutional Law," Notre 
Dame Law Review 29:4 (1954): 531. 
31. Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings, 1953, note 7 above, 825. 
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He also said that the administration had no intention of recommending 
ratification of the Genocide Convention. Despite this appeal, the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations voted to approve the amendment. 
Floor debate began on 20 January 1954. The Eisenhower administration 
continued to oppose the Bricker Amendment but had approved a much 
weaker proposal, the Knowland version, which had been offered as a sub- 
stitute.32 When the votes were finally taken, the Bricker version failed to 
receive the requisite two-thirds vote for a constitutional amendment--fifty- 
two Senators voted in favor, while forty were opposed.33 A weaker version 
proposed by Senator George came closer, falling one vote short of the 
requirement. 
What is important to remember in assessing these deliberations is that, 
while supporters of the amendment were reacting against human rights 
treaties, opponents of the amendment were not arguing in favor of the treaties. 
Arguments against the Bricker Amendment had little relevance to the debate 
over human rights treaties, and the defeat of the Bricker Amendment revealed 
nothing about support for the treaties. Opponents argued, for example, that 
the amendment would interfere with the day-to-day conduct of foreign affairs, 
significantly alter a constitutional balance of power that had worked well 
for 160 years, endanger national survival, limit the president's ability to 
conduct and end a war, impede arrangements for the control of atomic 
energy and nuclear weapons, and embarrass the president in front of both 
allies and enemies.34 
Throughout the records of the public debates related to human rights 
treaties, a single private interest group consistently held a dominant place 
and deserves special consideration: the American Bar Association (ABA).35 
The determination within the ABA that human rights treaties posed a threat 
to Americans' basic rights and to their system of government was crucial to 
the popularity of the Bricker proposal. In introducing the amendment in 
1953 Senator Bricker said: 
I should like to pay tribute to the magnificent work of the American Bar As- 
sociation and its Committee on Peace and Law through United Nations in alerting 
the American people to the dangers inherent in the treaty-making power.36 
32. "Foreign Policy," Congressional Quarterly Almanac 10 (1954): 255. 
33. Ibid., 255. 
34. Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings, 1953, note 7 above. 
35. The role of the ABA has been discussed in an article by John Schmidhauser and Larry 
Berg, "The ABA and the Human Rights Conventions: The Political Significance of Private 
Professional Associations," Social Research 38 (1971): 362-410. See also "Foreign Policy," 
Congressional Quarterly Almanac 9 (1953): 233. 
36. Congressional Record. 82nd Cong., 2d sess., 1952. Vol. 98, pt. 1, 910. 
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A study of ABA records reveals that the human rights treaties provided the 
initial impetus for the formulation of the amendment and a substantial reason 
for the ABA's strong support of it.37 
The ABA has consistently held a special status in the Senate's consid- 
eration of the human rights treaties. Its unique position was reflected in 
numerous statements by Senator Bricker in which he expressed his gratitude 
to the ABA for their help, including their suggestions on the rewording of 
the amendment.38 ABA members testifying in favor of the amendment were 
given special consideration; for example, they were invited by the Chairman 
of the Subcommittee to sit at his table." Special care was taken to consider 
their convenience for attending, and they were informed when important 
witnesses were testifying against the amendment. During the hearings, they 
frequently questioned other witnesses, a privilege normally reserved to mem- 
bers of the subcommittee. Arrangements were made so that one member 
could testify after all the opponents had finished their testimony in order to 
respond to any arguments that had been made.40 And, throughout the de- 
liberations, ABA positions on the amendment and on various treaties were 
cited by others as authoritative. 
A TYPOLOGY OF ARGUMENTS AGAINST RATIFICATION 
Previous sections have examined the arguments against human rights treaties 
found within the Bricker Amendment itself and within formal congressional 
deliberations. This section presents a typology of arguments offered in op- 
position to ratification of human rights treaties in the 1950s. While numerous 
hearings were held on the Bricker Amendment during this period, the single 
best source of anti-ratification arguments is the set of hearings held by the 
Senate Judiciary Committee in February and April of 1953. These were the 
most extensive hearings and they occurred when Senate support for the 
amendment was at its strongest. During these hearings, the Eisenhower 
administration made its commitment not to ratify the human rights treaties. 
This action made subsequent hearings less fruitful for our purposes, because 
it reduced the number of references by witnesses to the treaties. 
Content analysis of the 1953 hearings (the procedures for which are 
described in greater detail in the next section) reaffirms the appropriateness 
of using these hearings to explore arguments against human rights treaties. 
37. See Natalie Hevener Kaufman, Why the United States Doesn't Ratify Human Rights Treaties, 
forthcoming. 
38. Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings, 1953, note 7 above, 158. 
39. Ibid., 3. 
40. Ibid., 158. 
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TABLE 1 
Analysis of Testimony in Support of The Bricker Amendment, 
Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings, 1953 
Percentage of 
ABA Non-ABA All 
Topic Testimony Testimony* Testimony 
(n 
- 
208) (n = 92) (n = 300) 
Human Rights Treaties 49.5** 51.1 50.0 
General Abuse of Treaty Power 31.2 46.7 36.0 
Executive Agreements 11.1 0.0 7. 7 
Other*** 8.2 2.2 6.3 
*Included in this category were representatives from the following organizations: Veterans 
of Foreign Wars of the United States, New Orleans State, American Flag Committee, and National 
Society of the Daughters of the American Revolution. 
**Figures were computed by dividing the number of pages of testimony devoted to each 
topic by the total number of pages of testimony. The hearing included 300 pages of testimony 
in support of the Bricker amendment. 
***The "Other" category includes other topics discussed by witnesses, discussions related 
to the procedure of the hearings themselves, and supplementary materials provided by the 
witnesses-such as texts of treaties and lists of organizations and countries. 
Each page of testimony in support of the Bricker Amendment was coded 
according to the dominant topic of discussion. The results indicated a clear 
focus on human rights treaties. According to Table 1, the topic of human 
rights treaties accounted for 50 percent of the testimony. The other major 
issues of the hearings, executive agreements and the general abuse of the 
treaty-making power, together accounted for 43.7 percent. Also clear from 
the table is the significance of the role of the ABA. The testimony of members 
of the ABA's Special Committee on Peace and Law through the United 
Nations accounted for 69 percent of all testimony in support of the Bricker 
Amendment. The statements used in the remainder of this section to ex- 
emplify the arguments proposed are drawn almost entirely from this ABA 
testimony. 
Diminish Basic Rights 
The most frequently mentioned arguments against human rights treaties was 
that the treaties would diminish basic rights. They reflect a lower standard 
of rights, either intentionally or as a result of inevitable compromises, and 
citizens of the United States stand to lose rather than gain from ratification 
of the treaties. The argument rests on the contention that once a human 
rights treaty is ratified, constitutional protections would be superceded. Ar- 
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thur J. Schweppe, chair of the ABA Committee on Peace and Law through 
the United Nations, stressed this idea in his testimony: "The limitations in 
the first amendment with respect to freedom of speech, press, and religion 
are only limitations on Congress. They are not a limitation on the treaty- 
making power."41 And Frank Holman, one-time ABA president, presented 
this argument dramatically: 
the "internationalists" and the State Department move step by step-first aspira- 
tions, then ratification of these aspirations in treaty form, then international 
courts to enforce the aspirations. Thus our internal rights under our own Con- 
stitution, and Bill of Rights, are to be undermined step by step and will continue 
to be undermined unless the American people shut off this insidious process by 
an appropriate constitutional mendment.42 
Various specific rights which were thought to be endangered, including 
mostof the rights in the Bill of Rights, were discussed throughout the hearings. 
The testimony of ABA member Eberhard Deutsch on the freedom of the 
press conveys the flavor of these attacks: "[the treaties] contain the festering 
germs of destruction of a free press beyond the antiseptic properties of the 
first amendment."43 
Violate States' Rights 
Another frequently cited objection to the human rights treaties was the 
alleged threat they posed to states' rights. The treaties, it was argued, would 
legitimize federal action in areas formerly reserved to the states. Some op- 
ponents identified supremacy of the federal government as the ultimate 
objective of the treaties. Deutsch stated clearly: 
it is impossible to overemphasize the significance of present constitutionally 
possible abuses of the treatymaking power in the United States. The unques- 
tionable objective of at least some of the opponents of constitutional limitation 
of that power is early elimination of State and local political entities except as 
administrative agencies of the Nation. . ... The gilding of multipartite treaties 
with such idealistic immediate goals as the prevention of genocide and the 
promotion of human rights cannot conceal their underlying long-range objective 
to destroy local government while expanding the sphere of national power." 
41. Ibid., 59. 
42. Ibid., 143. Holman was president of the ABA from 1948 to 1949. He led a campaign, 
beginning in 1947, to alert the country to the dangers of "treaty law." This campaign 
targeted the United Nations human rights treaties as a threat to the American system and 
identified lawyers as the primary actors in halting the development and ratification of these 
treaties. 
43. Ibid., 116. 
44. Ibid., 115, 116. 
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Federal action with respect to civil rights was very much on the minds 
of those supporting the Bricker Amendment. Frank Holman described his 
concern: 
[A treaty] can increase the powers of the Federal Government at the expense 
of the States. For example, in the so-called field of civil rights, a treaty can do 
what he Congress has theretofore fused to do. The Congress has to date refused 
to enact the civil rights program.45 
He went on to explain that the federal government could accomplish this 
objective through ratification of the human rights treaties. Deutsch articulated 
the common concern that the treaties would be used specifically to legitimize 
federal legislation on racial matters: "and the same instrument has recently 
been cited with great force as a prohibition of race segregation in the District 
of Columbia, in Kansas, and in other States."46 
A common metaphor for the treaties often heard during the hearings 
was that of the Trojan Horse. Deutsch explained the metaphor well: 
the treaty clause of the Constitution (article VI) [is] as a 'Trojan Horse,' ready 
to unload its hidden soldiery into our midst, destroying State laws and consti- 
tutions and leaving behind the wreckage of the dream of the Founding Fathers 
which envisioned maintenance of the established constitutional balance be- 
tween State and Federal power, and preservation of the Bill of Rights intact.47 
Some of the specific states' rights which were mentioned during the hearings 
as being in danger of encroachment were the rights to restrict land sales on 
the basis of race and national origin, set criminal and civil liabilities, de- 
termine the political rights of women, establish qualifications for public 
school teachers, and regulate membership in the medical and legal profes- 
sions-which seemed especially unsettling to the testifying ABA members.48 
Promote World Government 
A third argument which was made frequently during the hearings was that 
human rights treaties constituted a move in the direction of establishing a 
world government. An ABA memorandum on the amendment was included 
in the testimony of Vernon Hatch and referred to the issue of world gov- 
ernment. 
45. Ibid., 145. 
46. Ibid., 116. 
47. Ibid., 119. 
48. Ibid., 100, 120-23, 1107, 1131, 1132. 
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Not only is the treaty power a threat o the States, it is a threat o the very Federal 
Government i self through the pressures of inter-nationally minded groups who 
would favor erecting a world government by the treaty route in whose favor we 
would abdicate much, if not all, of our sovereignty....49 
The danger evoked by Holman is of Americans waking up to find that they 
are living under world government. "We [could] have had a full-fledged 
world government overnight, and this is exactly what may happen under 
so-called treaty law unless a constitutional amendment is passed protecting 
American rights. .. ."50so Opponents of the amendment are portrayed as at 
best misguided and at worst ill-intentioned. George Finch's testimony is 
addressed to the former. 
The adoption of the proposed constitutional mendment now before this com- 
mittee relating to the treatymaking power would stop the prevailing trend to 
regard the United Nations as but the first step in the ultimate stablishment of
a world government in which the United States would occupy the position of 
a province. ... Now, the so-called liberals, the people who are opposing things 
that we are trying to do here would take us back into that era from which we 
emerged 300 years ago and subordinate our sovereignty, which means our 
freedom and our independence, to some foreign power in which we would 
have but one vote among many...*.s 
The latter view of the opposition is presented by Deutsch. 
It is difficult to believe that objections to a constitutional bulwark against direct 
legislative participation by Poland and the Argentine in the local affairs of 
Louisiana nd North Dakota nd Ohio and Utah can be rooted in good faith."s 
Subject Citizens To Trial Abroad 
A continuing argument which aroused strong emotional response was the 
allegation that human rights treaties would lead to the trial of Americans in 
foreign courts. The major points of the allegation are described in Ober's 
testimony. 
Among the 200 treaties that are being proposed is a treaty creating an inter- 
national criminal court... a court composed of all but one of foreign judges, 
including judges from other countries who have no conception of our inde- 
pendent judiciary but think only of the judges as an arm of the political gov- 
ernment.s3 
49. Ibid., 105. 
50. Ibid., 143. 
51. Ibid., 1108. 
52. Ibid., 115. 
53. Ibid., 168. 
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As implied in the statement above, aversion to the idea of trials abroad 
carried with it a suspicion of foreign judicial systems and fear of the loss of 
procedural safeguards. 
Meanwhile, the Genocide Convention is still on the agenda of the Senate for 
ratification, which, if ratified, would, among other things, commit us to the 
principle of the trial of American citizens in foreign courts . . . where our 
constitutional trial procedures and Bill of Rights would not operate.s4 
Threaten Our Form of Government 
A fifth line of opposition to the human rights treaties was the allegation that 
they constitute a serious threat to our form of government. In addition to 
the disintegration of the line between federal and state powers, testimony 
before the Senate Judiciary Committee frequently predicted the general de- 
struction of the American political system. The ABA Standing Committee 
report exemplified this line of reasoning, suggesting that "the real signifi- 
cance" of the amendment was "the preservation of our form of government 
against the abuse of the treaty power."55 Holman made a similar argument 
speaking of the human rights treaties and the need for the amendment. 
Our own Bill of Rights forbids the Congress to change our basic rights but as 
the Constitution ow stands it does not prevent our basic rights from being 
changed by a treaty made by the treatymaking a ency which consists of the 
President and two-thirds of the Senators present and voting. This is the loophole 
in the Constitution that we now face and through which the internationalists 
propose to move and by treaty law change and level out our American rights 
(both State and individual) and thereby change our form of government." 
Enhance Soviet/Communist Influence 
McCarthyism and the Cold War, which dominated the politics of the early 
1950s, had a clear impact on the debates concerning the human rights 
treaties. Arguments related to the communist scare appeared in two different 
forms. One, closely related to the preceding argument, emphasized the direct 
threat posed by the Soviet Union. The treaties were presented as manifes- 
tations of Soviet efforts to undermine the American system. Again the tes- 
timony of Finch is instructive: 
54. Ibid., 143-44. 
55. Ibid., 47. 
56. Ibid., 144. 
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the United States hould not participate in the negotiation of treaties, the effect 
of which would be to build around us a wall of socialistic and communist 
containment in anticipation of the withering away of our principles of human 
freedom and of the decay of the free institutions we have established to secure 
them. Are we so certain of our internal strength that we can resist indefinitely 
the communistic softening to which we are being subjected?s7 
More frequently, the spectre of communism appeared in allegations that the 
treaties contain socialist rights. The dangers outlined were multiple. 
One of the first documents produced under this program of world-wide reform 
... was the so-called Declaration of Human Rights.... This declaration, among 
other things, is a complete blueprint for socializing the world, including the 
United States. Article 23 provides that everyone has the right to "just and 
favorable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment" and that 
everyone has the right to "just and favorable remuneration. .. ." The purpose 
provided was to liquidate our individual enterprise system.58 
Senator Bricker also presented his concern that the treaties would alter our 
"control over our domestic, social, and economic rights, world medicine, 
socialized medicine.... I am trying to plug that loophole so that there will 
be no possibility of it."59 He also addressed the issue by stating: "You know 
that the American Medical Society is greatly disturbed about the possibility 
of socialized medicine in this country coming in by the back door of trea- 
ties."60 
Infringe on Domestic Jurisdiction 
The human rights treaties were consistently criticized on the grounds that 
they infringed upon the United States domestic jurisdiction and violated the 
domestic jurisdiction clause of the United Nations Charter. Some opponents 
believed that the treaties involved matters that were essentially domestic 
and beyond the legitimate reach of an international organization. Holman 
made this claim in citing a member of the United Nations Human Rights 
Division: 
who stated that what the Commission [on Human Rights] was proposing con- 
stituted an intervention in matters "within the domestic jurisdiction" of the 
member states. And he exposed this whole program which has since been under 
way in the United Nations, in my opinion not a program of peace at all, but a 
program for meddling in the affairs of the member states.6' 
57. Ibid., 1109-110. 
58. Ibid., 136. 
59. Ibid., 155. 
60. Ibid., 112. 
61. Ibid., 133. 
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Deutsch expressed the contention that domestic jurisdiction was threatened 
by human rights treaties: 
With similar suavity, albeit with greater logic, we were assured that section 7 
of article II of the Charter of the United Nations gave us added protection against 
interference by that world organization in our domestic affairs. But today even 
the opponents of constitutional imitations on treatymaking power can no longer 
sustain their confidence in understandings and reservations as adequate safe- 
guards against the destructive potentialities of international conventions.62 
Create Self-Executing Obligations 
A further, somewhat technical argument, made primarily by lawyers, was 
that the treaties were self-executing. Self-executing treaties need no imple- 
menting legislation to be effective and can be cited and applied by domestic 
courts. As we have seen, one provision of the Bricker Amendment was that 
no treaty would be implemented without congressional legislation. Finch 
explained this purpose of the amendment. "The purpose of the American 
Bar Association amendment [is] to make all treaties non-self-executing as 
internal aw and thus require legislation to make them internally effective."63 
He also elaborated upon the special problems of the human rights treaties 
as self-executing. 
That is why we had all this discussion about the Treaty on Human Rights. 
... The United Nations itself cannot by any declaration or resolution or draft 
treaty make law within the United States. When they do try to do it, it is through 
the treaty method because of our peculiar provision of our Constitution. What 
we are trying to do now is to plug that gap so they cannot do it that way and 
would be obliged to resort o legislation by the whole Congress." 
Increase International Entanglements 
Other arguments were generated by antipathy toward the United Nations 
and United Nations agencies and a fear of foreign entanglements. Non-ABA 
witnesses were particularly outspoken about their suspicions of the United 
Nations activities, especially action related to human rights. For example, 
Reverend DeLoss Scott appeared on behalf of the American Council of 
Christian Churches and spoke against the United Nations and especially 
62. Ibid., 115. 
63. Ibid., 1123. 
64. Ibid., 1148. 
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against the Covenant on Human Rights and the Genocide Convention. He 
cited the opening words of the Charter which "brings the United Nations 
down into the realm of human affairs, affairs which affect our daily lives as 
individuals" and praised Senator Patrick McCarran for his regret "to my 
dying day that ever voted for the U.N. Charter."6s 
W. L. McGrath, speaking on behalf of the United States Chamber of 
Commerce, presented a very critical view of the United Nations and its 
agencies. In speaking of the treaties produced by the United Nations, he 
said: 
Don't you see how devious these people plan how they move into the back 
door if they can't deal with you at the front door? They go around to the back 
door. And that is dangerous.... The issue cannot be dismissed by saying casually 
that of course even a bare quorum of the Senate could not conceivably ratify 
anything that would not be in conformity with the Constitution." 
Associated with the neo-isolationism of the time was an ethnocentrism, a 
suspicion of foreign states and a fear of entangling alliances. Holman ex- 
pressed the first of these concerns. "Why should we overlay our inherent 
and precious rights and freedoms with a pattern of international rights drawn 
to suit the concepts of more than 60 nations with varying and antagonistic 
concepts."" And Mrs. Enid Griswold, representing the National Economic 
Council, referred to the second of these issues. "The role of world leadership 
which ... has been thrust upon us, can best be fulfilled by preserving our 
American Republic and by limiting our international commitments to what 
we can do without weakening ourselves."68 
CONTEMPORARY OPPOSITION IN PERSPECTIVE 
To what extent, then, do the arguments against human rights treaties de- 
veloped in the 1950s, which crystalized during the debate over the Bricker 
Amendment, continue to influence contemporary congressional delibera- 
tions? We have explored two sources of data in addressing this question. 
First, we have compared the 1953 hearings on the Bricker Amendment with 
roughly comparable contemporary hearings. Second, we have interviewed 
congressional staff members in an attempt to assess the importance of the 
Bricker legacy from their perspective. 
65. Ibid., 273-74. 
66. Ibid., 565. 
67. Ibid., 142. 
68. Ibid., 176. 
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Stability of Arguments Over Time 
Two sets of congressional hearings were selected for content analysis. As 
already noted, the Bricker hearings in 1953 represent the best source of 
arguments against human rights treaties from the 1950s. For more contem- 
porary arguments, the single best source is the record of hearings held in 
1979 concerning four human rights treaties which were sent to the Senate 
by President Carter in 1978.69 Content analysis of the hearings, which in- 
cluded testimony from members of Congress as well as other witnesses, was 
limited to those witnesses who either supported the Bricker Amendment in 
the 1953 hearings or opposed any of the treaties discussed at the 1979 
hearings. 
The content of the testimony of each of the witnesses was analyzed 
according to the list of major lines of arguments, and minor variations on 
those arguments, presented in the Appendix (which summarizes the dis- 
cussion from the preceding section). All specific references to one or more 
human rights treaties were examined, and each new appearance of an ar- 
gument was assigned to the proper category.70 Hearings were coded inde- 
pendently by two investigators, and inconsistent codings were analyzed 
further. Results of the analysis are presented in Table 2, which provides 
figures which indicate, of the total number of arguments made in the hearings, 
the percentage of times each individual argument appeared. 
The results in Table 2 indicate the consistency of arguments made in 
opposition to human rights treaties, along with some interesting variation 
over time. Perhaps the clearest indication of consistency is that 93.5 percent 
of the arguments which appeared in the 1979 hearings were essentially 
unchanged from 1953. In addition, the relative frequency of arguments did 
not change significantly. The two principle arguments in both periods-that 
the treaties would diminish basic rights and violate states' rights-held the 
same rankings and accounted for a substantial proportion of the total ar- 
guments (38.2 percent in 1953 and 56.1 percent in 1979). The only argu- 
ments'which declined dramatically in frequency were concerns that the 
treaties would subject citizens to trial abroad and would increase interna- 
tional entanglements. The remaining arguments from 1953 were all clearly 
evident in the 1979 hearings, with their relative frequencies not significantly 
altered. 
69. The four treaties were: the two covenants, the American Convention, and the Racial 
Discrimination Convention. 
70. For similar efforts see Ole Holsti, Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities (Menlo Park, California: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1969); and Steven del Sesto, 
"Nuclear Reactor Safety and the Role of the Congressman: A Content Analysis of Con- 
gressional Hearings," journal of Politics 42 (1980): 227-41. 
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TABLE 2 
Analysis of Arguments Made Against Human Rights Treaties, 
Based on Senate Hearings in 1953 and 1979 
1953 1979 
Percentage Rank Percentage Rank 
Diminish Basic Rights 21.4% 1 32.7% 1 
Violate States' Rights 16.8 2 23.4 2 
Promote World Government 13.6 3 6.5 4 
Enhance Soviet/Communist Influence 11.2 4 4.7 8 
Subject Citizens to Trial Abroad 10.6 5 0.9 10 
Threaten Our Form of Government 7.8 6 11.2 3 
Infringe on Domestic Jurisdiction 6.5 7 5.6 6 
Increase International Entanglements 5.1 8 0.9 10 
Create Self-Executing Obligations 4.9 9 2.8 9 
Other 2.1 10 4.8 7 
New 1979 Arguments - 6.5 4 
Total 100.0 100.0 
(n = 387) (n = 107) 
The two new arguments which appeared during the 1979 hearings 
reflected changes in the political and economic environment. The first new 
argument was a response to the increased number of uncompensated ex- 
propriations of United States assets abroad and the apparent effort by de- 
veloping countries to legitimize them. This argument attacks the covenant 
provision on permanent sovereignty over natural resources. The United States 
representative throughout the drafting of the treaties argued that the wording 
might be interpreted as allowing expropriation of foreign investment without 
prompt and adequate compensation. Senator Jesse Helms was especially 
incensed about this provision, which he argued "would for the first time 
legitimize the unlawful expropriation without compensation or arbitrary 
seizure of Americans' property overseas."71 
The second new argument arose from domestic opposition to the wom- 
en's movement, particularly the ERA. Phyllis Schlafly was vehement in her 
contention in that the treaties would deprive American women of important 
protections. For example, she argued that the Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights would obligate the federal government to "register and conscript 
71. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Hearings on International Human 
Rights Treaties. 96th Cong., 1st sess., 1979. S. Rept. 8. 
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women for military service" whenever men were registered and conscripted. 
She also linked the destruction of women's rights to the loss of states' rights: 
mhis covenant would change the marriage laws of most of the 50 states by 
imposing 'equality of rights' as between the spouses during marriage.... The 
Covenant would also take away the rights of state legislatures in the fifty states 
to enact and retain the marriage laws desired by the people of each state and 
devised in a process of democratic decision-making.72 
Factors Inhibiting Action 
A second avenue for exploring contemporary arguments against human rights 
treaties is to assess the current opinions of members of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee. We interviewed the primary foreign policy staff mem- 
bers of ten of the sixteen committee members in the 98th Congress. Res- 
pondents were guaranteed anonymity. All unattributed quotations in this 
section are from these interviews. Interviews ranged in duration from forty 
to ninety minutes and were conducted in January 1984. 
At the time of the interviews, congressional action on human rights 
treaties appeared to be extremely unlikely. While still formally pending before 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the treaties were not on the con- 
gressional agenda. Supporters of the treaties did not appear to be planning 
any action to stimulate congressional consideration. They saw little political 
benefit to be gained in advocating the treaties, and feared the potential 
political controversy as the latent opposition to the treaties once again be- 
came vocal. Supporters were convinced that "if they brought [the treaties] 
up, they would be filibustered, and there would be efforts to amend them." 
One clear finding is that, whatever the influence of the Bricker Amend- 
ment, it is not often based on direct knowledge about the Bricker debate. 
Few of the staff members interviewed were even familiar with the specifics 
of the debate in the 1950s. Instead, the legacy lies in the near-universal 
perception that human rights treaties are inherently controversial. As one 
respondent expressed it, what is "important is the perception of a given 
treaty . . . everything gets categorized." Anything associated with human 
rights is viewed as "not immediate, apparently controversial, so we can push 
it aside." Another staff member indicated that "it was the Bricker Amendment 
controversy, and the incredible knock-down drag-out fight that Eisenhower 
had in fighting that off, that I think formed a lot of the basic background." 
What would it take to overcome this legacy? Respondents were asked 
to rank five factors according to their importance in explaining the current 
situation of the human rights treaties. According to Table 3, the most im- 
72. Ibid., 105, 108. 
1988 Bricker Amendment 333 
TABLE 3 
Rankings of Factors Inhibiting Passage of Human Rights Treaties, 
Based on Interviews with Senate Staff, 1984 
Staff Members 
Factor Republican Democratic All 
(n = 7) (n = 3) (n = 10) 
Support of Administration 1.9* 2.0 1.9 
Internal Senate Politics 2.3 3.0 2.5 
Public Opinion 3.6 1.3 2.9 
Content of Treaties 3.3 4.7 3.7 
Current International Situation 4.0 4.0 4.0 
*Figures are the average ranking (out of a possible 5) given to this factor by each category of 
staff. 
portant factor was the position of the president. Respondents, particularly 
Republican respondents, perceived that the lack of interest on the part of 
the Reagan administration was the most important factor in explaining why 
the Senate had no plans to consider, much less approve, the treaties. Presi- 
dential support was viewed as an essential ingredient for passage: "the 
administration has to be mobilized for the Congress to be mobilized;" the 
President would have to be behind them;" "a strong presidency to twist 
arms is the only way for [human rights] treaties to get through." 
Respondents often referred to the Carter administration, which did sign 
three human rights treaties and formally supported their passage in the Senate. 
The Carter administration's support of the human rights treaties, however, 
eventually became secondary to the support of other treaties: "the President 
only has so many cards to play, and Carter was sidetracked by Panama 
Canal and SALT II." In any case, a decision to take an active role in advocating 
human rights treaties is a difficult one to make, in light of the perceived 
meager political benefits. Advocating the treaties would be "politically 
costly" without tangible rewards: "the essential element [inhibiting passage] 
is a lack of political constituency ... people cannot see a direct link between 
the treaties and their overall interest." 
Debate over the Genocide Treaty in 1984, which occurred subsequent 
to the completion of the interviews, certainly supports this view of the role 
of the executive branch in promoting consideration of human rights treaties. 
President Reagan's unexpected endorsement of the Genocide Treaty resulted 
in the almost immediate Senate consideration. The Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee's passage of the treaty occurred just a few weeks later, despite 
universal pessimism on the part of Senate staff earlier that year. 
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A second general conclusion supported by Table 3 is that the actual 
content of the treaties is not viewed as the primary determinant of the current 
situation. Perception is important, not content. In general, staff members had 
not read any of the treaties and were unfamiliar with their content and 
objectives. They were, on the other hand, very clear about the expected 
response of opponents within and behind the Senate. Reactions to the treaties 
were based on their perceived controversiality, the absence of a large and 
powerful supporting constituency, and the lack of active presidential sup- 
port--not 
on the provisions of the documents. In matters of great controversy 
and small tangible return, proponents of the treaties generally preferred to 
remain inactive rather than to commit scarce resources of time, favors, and 
energy. 
CONCLUSION 
In this article we have analyzed the early opposition to human rights treaties 
in the United States Senate and the residual effect of this opposition on 
contemporary consideration of the treaties. We have documented that op- 
position to human rights treaties was central in the movement during the 
1950s to amend the treaty provisions of the Constitution. During the effort 
to pass the Bricker Amendment, arguments against human rights treaties 
were elaborated in their fullest form and were given national attention. 
Because of the strong historical support of the United States for human rights 
treaties, and the leading role this country played in drafting them, many had 
assumed that the question before the Senate would be "Why not ratify the 
treaties?" The hearings on the Bricker Amendment effectively turned that 
question around. Proponents of the treaties were put on the defensive, having 
to answer a host of legal and political criticisms. By the end of the hearings, 
these arguments had crystallized into a set of objections which, based on 
our analysis of the stability of arguments over time, appeared essentially 
unchanged in the 1979 hearings and which are still being cited today. 
These long-standing objections are not easily overcome-fears once 
raised are not easily laid to rest. The recent experience of the ABA provides 
a good illustration. Although very successful in the 1950s in dramatizing 
what they perceived to be the dangers of the treaties, the ABA in the mid- 
1970s reversed its position on all of the human rights treaties covered in 
this study and recommended Senate approval with reservations.3" Yet the 
73. The ABA approved the Supplementary Slavery Convention in 1967; the Genocide Con- 
vention (with specified understandings) in 1976; the Racial Discrimination Treaty (with 
reservations) in 1978; the American Convention on Human Rights (with reservations) in 
1979; and both Covenants on Human Rights (with reservations) in 1979. 
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treaties till have not received sustained Senate attention. The ABA's currently 
active campaign in support of the treaties-to persuade the Senate that the 
"dangers" inherent in the treaties have now disappeared-will certainly be 
a difficult ask, given the legacy of their original negative campaign which 
provided the underpinning for decades of opposition. 
The arguments of the 1950s fostered the perception that human rights 
treaties were controversial nd potentially dangerous. These arguments ap- 
pear today despite deep and widespread changes in United States domestic 
law on human rights and the ascendancy of human rights in regional and 
international fora. Continued United States inaction on human rights treaties 
confuses most of our citizens and many of our allies. Yet ratification remains 
unlikely. The personal campaign of Senator Bricker to "bury" human rights 
treaties continued as late as 1971, when he wrote to the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee during their hearings on the Genocide Convention: "I 
do not want to live to see the day that the Constitution of the United States 
and the Bill of Rights becomes a mere scrap of paper, and this treaty, if 
ratified, would be the beginning of such a process."74 The legacy of the 
Bricker Amendment appears to be continued opposition to human rights 
treaties, continued neglect of them by the United States Senate, and con- 
tinued evidence of the success of Senator Bricker's burial tactics. 
APPENDIX 
ARGUMENTS AGAINST U.S. RATIFICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
TREATIES 
1. DIMINISH BASIC RIGHTS: Human rights treaties reflect a lower stan- 
dard than is currently guaranteed; they will take away U.S. rights and 
protection. 
1 a. endanger the Bill of Rights 
lb. constitute an attack on the concept of inalienable rights 
1 c. deprive U.S. citizens of freedom of assembly 
1 d. deprive U.S. citizens of freedom of religion 
le. deprive U.S. citizens of freedom of the press 
if. deprive U.S. citizens of freedom of speech 
1 g. deprive U.S. citizens of the right of private property 
1 h. deprive U.S. citizens of the right to private medical care and to 
operate private medical practice 
74. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on the Genocide 
Convention. Hearings on the Genocide Convention. 92nd Cong., 1st sess., 1971. 137- 
39. 
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2. VIOLATE STATES' RIGHTS: Human rights treaties violate Constitutional 
protection of states' rights. They will give the Federal government pow- 
ers meant to be retained by the states. 
2a. land ownership by aliens may be allowed 
2b. professional medical and bar practice by aliens may be allowed 
2c. there is no federal-state provision in the treaties 
2d. racial matters 
2e. other states' rights 
3. PROMOTE WORLD GOVERNMENT: Human rights treaties are being 
used to move toward world government. 
3a. open us up to criticism in international fora 
3b. require us to impose international standards, which would con- 
stitute an erosion of sovereignty 
3c. subordinate us to foreign powers 
4. ENHANCE SOVIET/COMMUNIST INFLUENCE: Human rights treaties 
foster communism, soviet policies, and socialist rights. 
4a. Human rights treaties are a part of the Communist effort to take 
over the world. 
4b. specific mention of the Soviet Union 
4c. contain socialist rights, including economic, social and cultural 
rights 
4d. obligate governments to provide private sector services as public 
sector rights (food, shelter, clothing) 
4e. challenge the free enterprise system (right to strike, form trade 
unions) 
4f. anti-ILO 
5. SUBJECT CITIZENS TO TRIAL ABROAD: 
5a. deprive US citizens right to trial by jury 
5b. anti-international criminal court 
6. THREATEN OUR FORM OF GOVERNMENT: Human rights treaties 
will erode fundamental governmental powers. 
6a. The Founding Fathers would not approve 
6b. increase power of the president at the expense of Congress 
6c. result in loss of control over immigration 
6d. give president new power to seize property 
7. INFRINGE ON DOMESTIC JURISDICTION: Human rights treaties con- 
tain subjects which infringe on domestic matters. 
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8. INCREASE INTERNATIONAL ENTANGLEMENTS: Human rights trea- 
ties are the creation of the U.N. which is a suspect organization and 
will draw us into matters which should not concern us. 
8a. Anti-U.N. 
8b. Neo-isolationism 
9. CREATE SELF-EXECUTING OBLIGATIONS: Treaties are self-executing. 
9a. There is no non-self-executing provision in the treaties. 
9b. Other states can ratify without the treaties becoming domestic law; 
the U.S. cannot. 
10. OTHER: 
10a. Human rights treaties will undermine the ability of the U.N. to 
do its major job of security. 
10b. Human rights treaties contain only the rights we already have and 
provide no additional protections for U.S. citizens. 
10c. Experts ay that human rights treaties should not be ratified. 
11. NEW 1979 ARGUMENTS: 
11 a. Legitimate xpropriation of U.S. property abroad 
11 b. Diminish the rights of U.S. women 
